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Cognitive neuroscience: Who to play at poker
Heidi Johansen-Berg and Vincent Walsh
Every neuroscientist knows that emotions are as much
to do with the head as the heart, but as a number of
new studies show, the heart — or rather the body — and
the brain are by no means independent purveyors of
feeling and emotion.
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There’s a month’s salary on the table, you’re faced with a
cocky-looking opponent and you’ve only got three nines.
You were hoping to bluff your way through this hand, but
your opponent looks far from folding. So you start to get
anxious, unsure of what to do next and maybe just a little
scared. Faced with this scenario what is your best strategy,
and who would be your ideal opponent? Some recent
studies on the cognitive neuroscience of emotion might
not help you win at poker, but they do shed some light on
how the brain apprehends the emotions of the players and
calculates its own emotional response.
A seasoned card player might increase his chances of
pulling off the bluff by maintaining a poker face. But
many bodily expressions of emotion are less easy to control.
Emotional or stressful situations typically evoke auto-
nomic changes, such as increased heart rate, rising blood
pressure and sweaty palms. Some theories of emotion
place prime importance on brain representation of these
bodily changes in mediating feelings of emotion [1].
There are thought to be two levels at which bodily states
are represented in the brain. According to this theory,
sensory representations of the player’s body and external
objects, such as the opponent, the cards and the money —
which Damasio [1] calls first-order representations —
depend on regions of the brain, including the dorsal pons
(Figure 1), which are involved in maintaining homeostasis,
regardless of context. Second-order representations, which
contain the relationship between the different first-order
representations, can be updated according to changes in
behavioural and environmental context and are proposed
to depend on other brain areas, including the cingulate
cortex (Figure 1). Five recent studies [2–6] testify to the
value of this testable framework.
One recent study [2] investigated a specific patient group
to test the predictions arising from this theory [1]. Patients
with acquired pure autonomic failure do not produce the
autonomic changes normally elicited by emotional or stress-
ful situations. It was therefore predicted that these
patients would show differential activity in brain areas
associated with first-order and second-order representa-
tions of bodily states. Critchley et al. [2] used positron
emission tomography (PET) to scan patients and controls
while they performed easy or stressful tasks involving a
hand-grip or mental arithmetic. When they looked for dif-
ferences between patients and controls that were present
across all tasks, regardless of difficulty, they found increased
activation in the dorsal pons and somatosensory areas in
the patient group.
Critchley et al. [2] propose that this result confirms the
involvement of these brain regions in first-order represen-
tations of bodily state, regardless of context. But when
they compared the activations produced during stressful
tasks with those produced during easy tasks, and looked
for differences between the groups, they found that
patients showed decreased activation in posterior cingulate
and medial parietal regions and increased activation in the
anterior cingulate. This was thought to reflect the role of
these areas in mediating second-order remapping of body
states in response to changes in the emotional meaning of
the external objects.
Damasio’s theory [1] also predicts that the absence of
bodily changes should produce decreased feelings of
emotion. Although previous investigations of this patient
group have failed to reveal clear alterations in emotional
experience, Critchley et al. [2] do provide evidence of
subtle differences. Patients with pure autonomic failure
were less anxious, and agreed more strongly with state-
ments of reduced emotionality, compared with Parkin-
son’s disease patients, who were equally disabled but had
normal autonomic function. 
The general findings of the study [2] provide compelling
evidence for involvement of distinct brain regions in the
representation of first-order and second-order bodily
states, and the importance of such representations in the
subjective feeling of emotion. Some questions remain,
however. Although differences in brain activity in specific
regions are interesting, it is not clear why reduced auto-
nomic responsiveness should lead to increased activation
in some areas, relative to controls, and decreased activa-
tion in others. 
Damasio, whose theory underpins the view of emotions as
an aspect of bodily homeostasis, has also used brain
imaging to begin to get a feel for the anatomy of emotion
[3]. Damasio et al. [3] induced four primary emotions —
sadness, happiness, anger and fear — by asking subjects to
recall personal memories of emotional events. They com-
pared the emotion-related brain activation, again mea-
sured by PET, with activity associated with mental
imagery of neutral scenes. Consistent with Damasio’s own
predictions, and with the results reported by Critchley
et al. [2], their experiment also revealed emotion-related
activity in the pons and somatosensory cortex.
Clearly, your body representations would be responsible
for some of your feelings at the card table. But if you
cannot keep a poker face, your worry is whether or not
your opponent can read the tell-tale body signals — the
shaking hand, the nervous twitch, the unmistakable glint
of fear in the eyes. If your opponent happened to have a
damaged amygdala, then you might be in with a chance, as
neuropsychological studies have shown that this brain
region is essential for normal processing of expressions of
emotions [7]. Interestingly though, recognition of other
emotions seems to rely on different brain regions. For
example, when subjects viewed faces expressing varying
levels of disgust, it was the anterior insula and dorsal
striatum, rather than the amygdala, that were found to
increase their activity in line with the increasing emotional
intensity [8]. And when the amount of anger in a face was
varied, alterations in the activity of the medial frontal
cortex were detected [9].
A recent study [4] involving direct electrical recordings
from a patient undergoing surgery found that neurons in
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex fire more to aversive
scenes and fearful faces than to pleasant scenes or happy
faces. But brain imaging and cell-recording experiments
can only demonstrate a correlation between an activity
and a brain state, and another recent study [5] has helped
to clarify the crucial role of the medial frontal cortex
in processing expressions of anger. The results of this
study suggest it might be handy to have a transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) machine available at the
poker table (negotiate with your opponent first…), but
only if you think your opponent is cheating.
Harmer et al. [5] used TMS to transiently disrupt
processing in specific brain regions while subjects dis-
criminated expressions of anger and happiness from
neutral facial expressions. When TMS was applied over
the medial frontal cortex, subjects were significantly
slower at identifying angry expressions compared to trials
either without TMS or where the TMS was applied over a
medial parietal control site. In contrast, TMS did not slow
identification of happy facial expressions. This study there-
fore demonstrates that the medial frontal cortex is crucial
to normal processing of expressions of anger.
You win some you lose some: your body representations
may well help you enjoy or suffer, but to modify your
behaviour in future you need an abstract representation of
how much you won or lost. A recent study based on func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) helps add a
final piece to this emerging picture [6]. It has been known
for some time that neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex
respond to the reward value of a visual stimulus [10], but
in imaging studies a response in the orbitofrontal cortex to
abstract reward value had only been seen for positive
rewards, not punishments [11]. O’Doherty et al. [6] engaged
subjects in a simple stimulus–reward acquisition task, in
which the values of punishments and rewards was varied
from £10 to £600 of virtual money, and subjects were
given visual feedback on how much they won or lost with
each choice. Comparison of reward and punishment-
related brain activity showed that two separate regions of
the orbitofrontal cortex were involved in the representa-
tion of both reward and punishment, and the amount of
activity was positively correlated with the size of the win
or loss. 
This flurry of new results on the neurobiology of emotion
reflects the speed of advance in this field, now that
neurobiologically based theories [1] can be tested, but it
also raises a fundamental philosophical problem: if poker
involves the body so much, is it a sport?
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Figure 1
Summary diagram of the brain regions implicated in the representation
of emotion, as discussed in the text. The orbitofrontal cortex (green)
encodes the abstract value of the reward; the medial frontal cortex
(blue) is implicated in the detection of angry faces; the pons (yellow),
primary somatosensory cortex (red) and anterior (blue) and posterior
(pink) regions of the cingulate are thought to be responsible for first-
order and second-order body representations; and the amygdala (dark-
green stipple), is implicated in the detection of fearful faces.
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